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ENRON, DOMA, AND SPOUSAL PRIVILEGES:
RETHINKING THE MARRIAGE PLOT
I. Bennett Capers*
INTRODUCTION
The story of the collapse of Enron, at one time the world’s seventh
largest company, is familiar to many.1 Formed in Texas in 1985, Enron
boasted returns to investors of 600 percent by mid-1999,2 and 1,000 percent
by early 2000.3 What investors did not know was that Enron was engaging
in creative accounting to conceal its mounting debt from failed projects.4
Only later, near the end of 2001, did it become obvious that Enron’s
reported profits were largely the result of smoke and mirrors.5 Its stock
price, which hit a high of ninety dollars per share in mid-2000, fell to sixtyone cents on November 28, 2001.6 Less than a week later, Enron filed for
bankruptcy.7 At the time, it was the largest corporate bankruptcy in U.S.
history.8 By the end, the chain of events that resulted from Enron’s
collapse included congressional hearings;9 new insights into Enron’s role in
the California energy crisis of the 1990s;10 the criminal prosecution and
dissolution of its accounting firm Arthur Andersen;11 the criminal
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; J.D., Columbia Law School; B.A., Princeton
University. I am indebted to Melissa Murray and Darren Rosenblum for their insightful
comments, and to Toni Aillo, my librarian at my former institution, Hofstra Law School, for
her excellent research. Lastly, I owe a special thanks to Joe Landau for encouraging me to
participate in this Symposium, and for not taking “no” for an answer.
1. There are two excellent books on the Enron collapse. See KURT EICHENWALD,
CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS: A TRUE STORY (2005); BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE
SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND FALL OF ENRON (2003).
2. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 1, at 10–14, 229.
3. Id. at 229.
4. Id. at 150–70.
5. The first serious scrutiny of Enron is traceable to a March 2001 article in Fortune
magazine. See Bethany McLean, Is Enron Overpriced?, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2001, at 123
(noting that Enron was trading at 55 times its earnings, notwithstanding the fact that the
source of its income was unclear).
6. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron Collapses as Suitor Cancels
Plans for Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at A1.
7. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron Corp. Files Largest U.S. Claim
for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at A1.
8. Id.
9. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Joseph Kahn, Enron’s Ex-Chief Harshly Criticized by
Senate Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2002, at A1.
10. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 1, at 264–83.
11. Arthur Andersen was found guilty of obstructing justice in connection with its
shredding of thousands of documents relating to its audit of Enron. See Cathy Booth

715

716

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

prosecution of several Enron insiders, including Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer Kenneth Lay, President and Chief Executive Officer
Jeffrey Skilling, and Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow;12 and the
passage of new securities regulations in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.13
That much is well known. What is less well known is the issue Enron
almost raised about the Defense of Marriage Act14 (DOMA) and spousal
privileges. This “almost raised” issue is the subject of Part I of this Essay.
Part I recounts the story of the first executive to be arrested as part of the
Enron debacle, Michael Kopper, who happens to be gay. On the surface,
the story of Kopper and his partner, William Dodson, may seem
insignificant: unlikely to repeat itself, inconsequential, and illustrative of
just one of the hundreds of disadvantages facing same-sex couples under
DOMA. After all, how important is an “almost raised” story about the
interplay of evidentiary rules and DOMA? But dig deeper, and the Kopper
and Dodson story raises questions that go well beyond Enron, DOMA, and
spousal privileges. Indeed, it raises issues that go beyond the solution
advocated by many of the contributors to this symposium, and by every
mainstream LGBT advocacy group: the solution of marriage equality. Or
at least this is what I argue in Part II. To my mind, the Kopper and Dodson
story ultimately raises questions about the prioritization by LGBT groups of
marriage equality as a goal, and about the belief, shared by many, that
marriage equality will be the catalyst that ends other inequalities.
In a way, the goal of this Essay is straightforward. It asks, at a time when
President Obama has announced his support for marriage equality,15 when
public support is growing,16 and when so much seems aligned (the stars and
the wedding bells) in our favor, that we take a breather. It adds another
voice to the small group of legal scholars who question the relentless push
for marriage equality and ask, “But?” (It speaks volumes that the small
group is comprised mostly of women.)17 It asks, before we commit

Thomas, Called to Account, TIME, June 24, 2002, at 52. Though the Supreme Court later
reversed the conviction, Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005), by
then the firm had dissolved, resulting in the termination of approximately 85,000 employees.
Editorial, Andersen Died in Vain, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 2012, at A22.
12. Alexei Barrionuevo, 2 Enron Chiefs Are Convicted in Fraud and Conspiracy Trial,
N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at A1; Alexei Barrionuevo, Skilling Sentenced to 24 Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006, at C1.
13. See Michael W. Peregrine, Another View: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Legacy of Enron,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 25, 2011, 10:30 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/
11/25/another-view-sarbanes-oxley-and-the-legacy-of-enron/.
14. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
15. Jackie Calmes & Peter Baker, Obama Endorses Same-Sex Marriage, Taking Stand
on Charged Social Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2012, at A1.
16. See infra notes 61–64.
17. The women I am thinking of are Katherine Franke, Paula Ettelbrick, and Nancy
Polikoff.
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everything, “Can we just talk some more?”18 In short, this Essay begins
again—before it is too late—another “uncomfortable conversation.”19
But all of that comes later. For now, I begin with Enron and the “almost
raised” issue of spousal privileges.
I. ENRON AND SPOUSAL PRIVILEGES
One of the first targets of the criminal investigation into Enron’s
collapse, and the first Enron executive to plead guilty and enter into a
cooperation agreement with the Government, was Michael Kopper.20 With
his boss Andrew Fastow, Kopper manufactured a series of arcane, offbalance special purpose entities that, together with mark-to-market
accounting, allowed Enron to bypass reporting requirements, stash its
growing debt and underperforming assets, and report speculative future
earnings on a cash basis when in fact Enron was losing money.21 These
special purpose entities also allowed Enron insiders to skim millions of
dollars from the company for their personal use.22 For example, in one
transaction, Kopper and Fastow each invested $25,000 in a special purpose
entity, from which they gained a profit of $4.5 million in a matter of
months.23 By the time of Enron’s collapse, Kopper had pocketed more
than $16 million through his use of special purpose entities; Fastow had
taken more than $40 million.24
It was the concealment of debt, rather than the self-dealing of its
employees, that caused Enron’s collapse. And it was here that Kopper’s
partner, Dodson, became useful. In order to conceal some of Enron’s debt,
a special purpose entity was placed in Dodson’s name.25 According to
some observers, Jeffrey Skilling believed that the lack of legal recognition
of Kopper’s relationship with Dodson would make investigators less likely

18. Perhaps no legal scholar has been more eloquent than Katherine Franke in urging
restraint, or at least that we resist “the normative and epistemic frame that values nonmarital
forms of life in direct proportion to their similarity to marriage, [and] unseat marriage as the
measure of all things.” Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
2685, 2686 (2008).
19. I am thinking here of Martha Fineman’s wonderful collection of essays. See
FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY:
INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE
CONVERSATIONS (Martha Albertson Fineman et al. eds., 2009).
20. Landon Thomas, Jr., Call It the Deal of a Lifetime, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, at C1.
21. Id. For example, in 2000, Enron used mark-to-market accounting to claim more than
$110 million in estimated profits from a twenty-year agreement it entered into with
Blockbuster Video. In fact, the deal fell apart, resulting in a loss. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra
note 1, at 291–99.
22. Mary Flood & Tom Fowler, Enron from the Inside, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 28, 2004,
at A1.
23. Id.
24. Thomas, supra note 20.
25. Chris Bull, Enron’s Domestic-Partner Scam, ADVOCATE, Mar. 19, 2002, at 21;
Jeremy Quittner, Odd Man Out at Enron: Did Michael Kopper’s Sexual Orientation Play a
Role in his Becoming the First Man to Fall in the Country’s Biggest Corporate Scandal?,
ADVOCATE, Oct. 15, 2002, at 28.
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“to connect Dodson’s work at [the special purpose entity] to Kopper’s work
at Enron.”26
Although it is impossible to say with certainty, it is likely that
investigators and federal prosecutors picked Kopper as an initial target
because they hoped he would cooperate and assist them in their
investigation of Fastow, who in turn could lead them to Kenneth Lay and
Jeff Skilling.27 In addition, Kopper’s sexuality likely made him an easy
target for negotiating a plea.28 But there was something else that gave
prosecutors the upper hand vis-à-vis Kopper, something that Kopper’s
defense lawyer likely brought to his attention early on: the unavailability of
any spousal privilege.
In brief, federal law recognizes two spousal privileges in criminal cases:
the spousal immunity privilege and the marital communications privilege.29
Under the spousal immunity privilege, spouses cannot be compelled to
testify against one another.30 One rationale for this privilege is that there is
a “natural repugnance” to forcing one spouse to testify adversely against
“his intimate life partner.”31 Under the second spousal privilege, the
marital communications privilege, either spouse can prevent the other from
disclosing any confidential communication made during the course of the
marriage. The presumption is that all communications between spouses are
confidential.32
Both privileges would have been available had Kopper been married to a
woman rather than partnered with Dodson. Had Kopper been married to a
woman, she could have asserted both privileges to avoid testifying before a
grand jury or at trial, even in the face of a subpoena.33 Even if his wife had
26. Quittner, supra note 25, at 28.
27. See id. In fact, the government did eventually secure the cooperation of Fastow to
testify against Skilling and Lay. Alexei Barrionuevo, Who Will Steal the Enron Show?, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at C1. For a discussion of the practice of prosecuting lower-level
offenders in order to convict higher-level offenders, see Miriam Hechler Baer,
Cooperation’s Cost, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 903 (2011); Harry Litman, Pretextual
Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1152–53 (2004).
28. There were likely a couple of dynamics at play here. One, the government could
have traded on the common perception that gay men are targeted for abuse, including rape,
in prison. See Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1267 (2011). Two,
the government could have traded on the assumption that Kopper would not want his
sexuality widely known. Either dynamic might induce Kopper to cooperate against Fastow
in return for keeping his sexuality secret or avoiding abuse in prison. For an exploration of
some of these prosecutorial tactics, see id. at 1284–88.
29. I am bracketing the complicated choice of law issues that come up in federal cases in
which state law supplies the rule of decision, as in diversity actions.
30. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2228, 2333
(1961).
31. Id.
32. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951).
33. Of course, evidentiary privileges have little effect on what is discoverable during
other parts of the investigation. Such privileges, for example, play little if any role in the
police interrogation of witness-spouses during the course of an investigation. See, e.g.,
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (both the husband and wife were interrogated;
the wife later invoked spousal privilege at trial to refuse to testify against her husband);
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been willing to testify, Kopper could have unilaterally barred her from
repeating anything he told her in confidence.
Neither privilege was available to Kopper or Dodson. If we imagine
justice as scales, then the interplay between privilege law and DOMA
tipped the scales of justice against Kopper. In part, this is because the first
prerequisite to either spousal privilege is a validly recognized marriage.
But this is also because of section 3 of DOMA, which, for purposes of
federal law, expressly defines “marriage” and “spouse” as excluding samesex couples.34 Put differently, even if Kopper and his partner had been
legally married,35 and even if Texas recognized their marriage,36 section 3
of DOMA would arguably still have prohibited a federal court from
recognizing their marriage.37
This is not to suggest that a creative lawyer could not find a way to argue
around DOMA. The Federal Rules of Evidence, until very recently,
contained only one rule addressing privileges.38 Instead of delineating the
parameters of an attorney-client privilege or a clergy-penitent privilege,
Congress adopted a single catch-all rule:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by an Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (the wife was interrogated and agreed to
cooperate against her husband; her trial testimony was limited by the marital communication
privilege). It should also be noted that some courts have ruled that the privileges are not
available in situations where both spouses have engaged in joint criminal activity. See, e.g.,
United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1983). I am setting aside whether this
joint-crime exception could have been applied to compel the testimony of spouses in the
Enron case.
34. Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
35. All of this is theoretical, of course. In fact, the first state to permit same-sex
marriages, Massachusetts, did not do so until 2003. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
36. Again, this is theoretical. In fact, Texas is one of many states that have enacted their
own mini-DOMAs. These are state laws or state constitutional amendments that define
marriage in heterosexual terms for purposes of state law and often specifically decline legal
recognition of same-sex pairings. Texas has also gone a step further by amending its
constitution to bar recognition of “any legal status identical or similar to marriage.” TEX.
CONST., art. I, § 32. For a brief discussion of whether this amendment also bars Texas from
recognizing heterosexual marriages, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT
STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES 147–48 (2006).
37. This would be true even if Enron were headquartered in Massachusetts (a marriage
equality state), and Kopper and his partner were legally married residents of Massachusetts,
where a Massachusetts state court would recognize their marriage and grant them the
evidentiary privileges that come with it. Under DOMA, a federal court in Massachusetts
would arguably still be prohibited from recognizing their marriage.
38. The Advisory Committee originally proposed to Congress thirteen separate rules to
establish general principles of privilege law, which would have codified nine specific
evidentiary privileges. PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE § 37.02, at 575 (3d
ed. 2009). After much controversy over the rules—including objections that the proposed
rules failed to include any privilege for marital confidences, physician-patient
communications, or journalists and their sources—Congress rejected the proposed rules and
passed a single rule, Rule 501, instead. Id. § 37.02, at 576. In 2008, Congress added Rule
502, which concerns the attorney-client privilege and work product. FED. R. EVID. 502.
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Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by
the principles of common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in light of reason and experience.39 However, in civil
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be determined in accordance with State law.40

On its face, the rule looks both forward and backward. It looks backward
in time by mandating that privileges “shall be governed by the principles of
common law.”41 At the same time, it looks forward through its inclusion of
the phrase, “as [such principles] may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience.”42 Thus, by its terms,
Rule 501 allows federal courts to develop new privileges. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has recognized Congress’s “affirmative intention not to
freeze the law of privilege,”43 but instead to “leave the door open to
change”44 and “provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of
privilege on a case-by-case basis”45 in order to “continue the evolutionary
development of testimonial privileges.”46 Hence, in Trammel v. United
States,47 the Supreme Court invoked Rule 501’s flexibility to modify the
spousal immunity privilege. Prior to Trammel, either spouse could assert
the spousal immunity privilege; post-Trammel, and consistent with
changing views about equality in marriage,48 the right to assert the privilege
now vests solely in the witness-spouse.49 And in Jaffee v. Redmond,50 the
Supreme Court invoked Rule 501’s flexibility to create an entirely new
federal privilege for psychotherapists and their patients.51 Lower courts
have used Rule 501’s permissive language to recognize still other
privileges.52
39. FED. R. EVID. 501 (restyled 2011).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
44. Id. The Senate Report reflected this sentiment, explaining that Rule 501 “should be
understood as reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based on a confidential
relationship . . . should be determined on a case-by-case basis.” S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 13
(1974).
45. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 40891 (1974) (statement of Rep.
Hungate).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 52 (“The ancient foundations for so sweeping a privilege have long since
disappeared. Nowhere in the common-law world—indeed in any modern society—is a
woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity
associated with recognition as a whole human being.”).
49. Id. at 53.
50. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
51. Id. at 18.
52. For example, two district courts have invoked Rule 501’s expansive language to
recognize a parent-child confidential communications privilege. See In re Grand Jury
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In theory, a federal court could get around DOMA by recognizing a
separate privilege for same-sex couples.53 Although DOMA would
arguably prevent the court from treating a same-sex couple as married and
thus entitled to marital privileges,54 DOMA would not prevent a court from
creating new privileges, say, a “cohabiting couples” privilege, that would be
available for same-sex couples. In other words, the court could, in theory at
least, play a name game to avoid running afoul of DOMA and simply not
call the relationship marriage.
Such a court could even find ample justification for the creation of a new
privilege that would, implicitly or explicitly, benefit same-sex married
couples. Although “there is a general duty to give what testimony one is
capable of giving,”55 the Supreme Court has allowed exceptions in the form
of privileges where there is a “public good transcending the normally
predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining
truth.”56 Here, the public good that would attend the recognition of
privileges for married same-sex couples (or married-like couples in
jurisdictions where marriage is unavailable) is identical to the public good
that attends the recognition of privileges for married heterosexual couples.
Consider the public good articulated in Hawkins v. United States57:
The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or
husband against wife in a trial where life or liberty is at stake was a belief
that such a policy was necessary to foster family peace, not only for the
benefit of husband, wife and children, but for the benefit of the public as
well. Such a belief has never been unreasonable and is not now.58

Certainly, the benefit of fostering family peace exists whether the couple is
heterosexual or not. Assuming the relationship is one the community
believes should be fostered, extending such a privilege also satisfies John
Proceedings, Unemancipated Minor Child, 949 F. Supp. 1487 (E.D. Wash. 1996)
(recognizing a parent-child communications privilege); In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D.
Nev. 1983) (same). Federal circuit courts have generally declined to follow suit. See, e.g., In
re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1997) (declining to recognize a parent-child
privilege); United States v. Erato (In re Erato), 2 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1993) (same); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings of John Doe v. United States, 842 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1988) (same); Port v.
Heard, 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir.
1985) (same); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Santarelli), 740 F.2d 816 (11th Cir. 1984) (same):
United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982) (same); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d
876 (9th Cir. 1980) (same).
53. “[Rule 501] . . . did not freeze the law governing the privileges of witnesses in
federal trials at a particular point in our history, but rather directed federal courts to ‘continue
the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges.’” Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8–9 (quoting
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47).
54. A court could also read DOMA as not applying to the recognition of privileges.
55. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2192 (3d ed. 1940)).
56. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); see also Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
57. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
58. Id. at 77.
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Henry Wigmore’s proposed test for recognizing new privileges.59 Since
Rule 501 would allow a court to factor in societal changes—as the Court
did in Trammel60—the court could also consider the trend toward marriage
equality in the states,61 as well as public support for marriage equality,62
and even greater support for equalizing the benefits and obligations of
marriage.63 Relying on recent census data, the court could consider the
sizeable number of same-sex couples who would benefit from the
allowance of spousal privileges.64 Of course, a more aggressive court could
simply declare DOMA unconstitutional. A few courts have done so
already,65 and others are sure to do so in the near future given the Obama
Administration’s determination that DOMA is unconstitutional66 and its
decision no longer to defend section 3 of DOMA.67
My point, though, is not to draft a blueprint for circumventing DOMA.
Nor is my point to complain about yet another benefit denied to same-sex
couples by virtue of DOMA. A 2004 report from the U.S. Government
Accountability Office identified 1,138 provisions of federal law that
distinguish between people who are married and those who are not.68 Of
these, spousal privileges are likely minor ones, unless one is in a same-sex
relationship and facing federal criminal prosecution. My point is decidedly
different. Specifically, my point is to call into question the “marriage plot.”
59. See WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 2285.
60. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52.
61. Six states and the District of Columbia permit same-sex couples to marry. In total,
twenty states and the District of Columbia provide legal recognition for same-sex couples
and their dependents. See Same-Sex Relationship Recognition Laws: State by State, HUMAN
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/same-sex-relationship-recognitionlaws-state-by-state (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
62. See Peter Baker, Same-Sex Marriage Support Shows Pace of Social Change
Accelerating, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2012, at A20 (citing a Pew research poll showing
increased American support for same-sex marriage, including a 26-point swing in the last
decade); Nate Silver, Support for Gay Marriage Outweighs Opposition in Polls, N.Y. TIMES
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 9, 2012, 4:52 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/
05/09/support-for-gay-marriage-outweighs-opposition-in-polls/.
63. See Cindy Ok, Majority of Americans Back Same-Sex Civil Unions, SLATE, (May,
14, 2012, 11:35 AM), http://slatest.slate.com/posts/2012/05/14/gay_civil_union_support_6_
in_10_americans_back_civil_unions_but_less_than_half_support_gay_marriage_.html
(reporting that approximately 62 percent of Americans polled supported some form of legal
recognition for same-sex couples).
64. The 2010 census data reported 131,729 same-sex married couple households and
514,735 same-sex unmarried partner households in the United States. Census Bureau
Releases Estimates of Same-Sex Married Couples, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 27, 2011),
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb11-cn181.html.
65. See, e.g., Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. C 10-01564 CW, 2012 WL
1909603 (N.D. Cal. May 24, 2012); Golinski v. U. S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d
968 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Gill v. U. S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass.
2010).
66. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John A.
Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html.
67. Id.
68. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO
PRIOR REPORT (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/92441.pdf.
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II. THE MARRIAGE PLOT
Recently, I have been thinking about Jeffrey Eugenides’s novel The
Marriage Plot,69 which references through its title a recurring trope in
nineteenth century fiction. Think of almost any novel by Jane Austen,
many of which end with either a marriage proposal or a marriage
ceremony.70 Or think of Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre, the last chapter of
which famously opens with the line, “Reader, I married him.”71 Marriage
as climax72 was a popular narrative device in nineteenth century fiction73—
indeed, remnants can be found in popular entertainment today74—because
back then at least, it told the reader everything the reader needed to know.
A suitable marriage, especially at a time when property passed to male
heirs, meant that a woman would have a home over her head, would be
financially provided for, could serve her function of producing children, and
would satisfy the basic requirements for being well-regarded in society.
There were no lingering questions. Marriage settled everything—at least in
nineteenth-century fiction. Indeed, it is precisely the passing from
prominence of this plot device that prompts a character’s complaint in The
Marriage Plot. The character, a professor of English literature, laments to
his students that the novel, as a form, “reached its apogee with the marriage
plot and had never recovered from its disappearance. In the days when
success in life had depended on marriage, and marriage had depended on

69. JEFFREY EUGENIDES, THE MARRIAGE PLOT (2011).
70. Securing a suitable marriage, of course, is what motivates the plots in Austen’s Pride
and Prejudice, Sense and Sensibility, and Emma. This goal is made explicit by the narrator
of Pride and Prejudice, which opens with the line: “It is a truth universally acknowledged,
that a single man in possession of a good fortune, must be in want of a wife.” JANE AUSTEN,
PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 27 (Dell Publ’g Co. 1959) (1813).
71. CHARLOTTE BRONTË, JANE EYRE 489 (Random House, Inc. 1950) (1847). It is
telling that in her most recent novel, Lorrie Moore subverts this expectation. At the end of A
Gate at the Stairs, the narrator is propositioned by the handsome, older man she once
worked for as a babysitter. The novel concludes with the lines: “Reader, I did not even have
coffee with him. That much I learned in college.” LORRIE MOORE, A GATE AT THE STAIRS
322 (2009).
72. The reference to climax is not meant to be prurient, but to recall Roland Barthes
analysis of codes that inform literary texts. One such code, the hermeneutic, sets up delayed
gratification, which Barthes compares to the unveiling of robes. See ROLAND BARTHES, S/Z
18–20 (1970); see also ROLAND BARTHES, THE PLEASURE OF THE TEXT (Richard Miller
trans., Hill & Wang 1975) (1973).
73. See, e.g., RACHEL ABLOW, THE MARRIAGE OF MINDS: READING SYMPATHY IN THE
VICTORIAN MARRIAGE PLOT (2007); JENNI CALDER, WOMEN AND MARRIAGE IN VICTORIAN
FICTION (1976); Kathy Alexis Psomiades, The Marriage Plot in Theory, in 43 NOVEL: A
FORUM ON FICTION 53 (2010); Tamara S. Wagner, Marriage Plots and “Matters of More
Importance”:
Sensationalising Self-Sacrifice in Victorian Domestic Fiction, in
ANTIFEMINISM AND THE VICTORIAN NOVEL: REREADING NINETEENTH-CENTURY WOMEN
WRITERS 137 (Tamara S. Wagner ed., 2009).
74. Contemporary examples of the marriage plot can be found in romance novels, such
as those of Nora Roberts, and even in the popular television show Downton Abbey, the
second season of which ends, quite literally, with a marriage proposal. Downton Abbey:
Christmas Special (ITV television broadcast Dec. 25, 2011). Arguably, even the television
show Sex and the City is indebted to the marriage plot.
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money, novelists had had a subject to write about. The great epics sang of
war, the novel of marriage.”75
I am thinking of the marriage plot in nineteenth-century fiction because it
seems as if, like starry-eyed readers, we are expecting a similar “marriage
plot” in our push for marriage equality. Never mind that lesbians and gays
continue to be discriminated against in employment76 and housing77 and are
disproportionately targeted for hate crimes;78 those problems, like the lack
of security facing unmarried English women in the nineteenth century, will
recede once we can marry, since marriage is the real barrier that keeps us
from being welcomed into the fold. We expect this notwithstanding the
waning of the marriage plot in fact and fiction,79 and notwithstanding that
even in nineteenth-century fiction, the plot device of “happy ever after”
was, just below the surface, a questionable one. Jane Eyre marries
Rochester at the end, but let us not forget she is his second wife. He kept
the first locked in the attic, prompting a cottage industry of feminist literary
criticism,80 as well as several prominent law and literature analyses.81
There is even the feminist reimagining of Jane Eyre in the form of Jean
Rhys’s novel Wide Sargasso Sea.82
This reliance on the “marriage plot” is one response to the issue Enron
“almost raised” about DOMA and spousal privileges. As many of my
students respond when I raise this issue in class, the “real” answer is to
repeal DOMA or have it ruled unconstitutional, and thus allow Kopper and
75. EUGENIDES, supra note 69, at 22.
76. See Jennifer C. Pizer et al., Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace
Discrimination Against LGBT People: The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting
Discrimination and Providing for Equal Employment Benefits, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715,
722–28 (2012).
77. See Equal Access to Housing in HUD Programs—Regardless of Sexual Orientation
or Gender Identity, 76 Fed. Reg. 4194, 4194 (Jan. 24, 2011) (noting evidence that lesbian
and gay individuals and families lack equal access to housing).
78. See Mark Potok, Anti-Gay Hate Crimes: Doing the Math, S. POVERTY L. CENTER,
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2010/winter/
anti-gay-hate-crimes-doing-the-math (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
79. As the professor of English literature observes in The Marriage Plot: “Sexual
equality, good for women, had been bad for the novel. And divorce had undone it
completely. What would it matter whom Emma married if she could file for separation
later? How would Isabel Archer’s marriage to Gilbert Osmond have been affected by the
existence of a prenup?” EUGENIDES, supra note 69, at 22.
80. See, e.g., NINA AUERBACH, ROMANTIC IMPRISONMENT: WOMEN AND OTHER
GLORIFIED OUTCASTS 70, 197–204 (Carolyn G. Heilbrun & Nancy K. Miller eds., 1986);
SANDRA M. GILBERT & SUSAN GUBAR, THE MADWOMAN IN THE ATTIC: THE WOMAN WRITER
AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY LITERARY IMAGINATION 339 (1979); ELAINE SHOWALTER, A
LITERATURE OF THEIR OWN: BRITISH WOMEN NOVELISTS FROM BRONTË TO LESSING 118–22
(1977).
81. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, The Jurisprudence of Jane Eyre, 15 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J.
173 (1992); Michele Cammers Goodwin, The Black Woman in the Attic: Law, Metaphor
and Madness in Jane Eyre, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 597 (1999); Linda R. Hirshman, Brontë, Bloom,
and Bork: An Essay on the Moral Education of Judges, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 177 (1988);
Debora L. Threedy, The Madness of a Seduced Woman: Gender, Law, and Literature, 6
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1 (1996).
82. JEAN RHYS, WIDE SARGASSO SEA (1966).
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Dodson, as well as innumerable other same-sex couples in the country, to
enjoy the same privileges as heterosexual married couples. Other students
focus on more practical and immediate answers. For example, an attorney
representing Kopper might argue that same-sex couples are entitled to the
same evidentiary privileges as different-sex married couples, and that
Kopper’s communications with his partner Dodson should similarly be
protected. The attorney would argue that the court has the authority, in
light of “reason and experience,” to extend marital privileges
notwithstanding DOMA.83 Or, making a slightly broader claim, the
attorney might argue that any couple in a marriage-like relationship,
including unmarried heterosexual couples, should be able to secure the
benefits of the these evidentiary privileges. Of course, even these
arguments are still variations on the marriage plot.
But one can imagine other plots that do not use marriage as the
measuring stick for determining what relationships are deserving of
protection. For example, one might argue that familial groupings should be
entitled to privileges. There could be an evidentiary privilege for siblings,84
or for the parent-child relationship. Consider In re Grand Jury,85 in which
the Third Circuit considered three appeals presenting the same critical issue:
whether the court should recognize a parent-child privilege. In one appeal,
a father had been subpoenaed to testify against his teenage son.86 In
another, a sixteen-year old was subpoenaed to testify against her father.87
Though the Third Circuit declined to create a parent-child privilege,88 it
acknowledged its ability to do so89 and that there were strong arguments in
support of such a privilege.90 Building on those arguments, one could
argue that the better result would be to extend privileges to familial
relationships in order to further society’s interest in protecting the family
unit.
83. This need not necessarily involve a challenge to the constitutionality of DOMA.
Rather, given Rule 501’s permissive language, a federal court could extend evidentiary
privileges to same-sex married couples either by side-stepping the term marriage, or by
ruling that such an extension does not implicate DOMA insofar as the court is not
“determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States.” 1
U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
84. As Jill Elaine Hasday has recently discussed, the law’s focus on preserving marital
relationships coexists with indifference to safeguarding sibling relationships. See Jill Elaine
Hasday, Siblings in Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 897 (2012).
85. 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir. 1997).
86. Id. at 1142–43.
87. Id. at 1143.
88. Id. at 1157.
89. Id. at 1149.
90. Id. at 1146 n.12 (citing law review articles). For additional arguments in favor of
such a privilege, see, for example, Gregory W. Franklin, Note, The Judicial Development of
the Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: Too Big for Its Britches?, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV.
145 (1984); Susan Levine, Comment, The Child-Parent Privilege: A Proposal, 47
FORDHAM L. REV. 771 (1979); Catherine Chiantella Stern, Note, Don’t Tell Mom the
Babysitter’s Dead: Arguments for a Federal Parent-Child Privilege and a Proposal to
Amend Article V, 99 GEO. L.J. 605 (2011).

726

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

Going even further, one can imagine an argument that seeks to protect
individuals without regard to whether they are in a marital or marriage-like
relationship and without regard to their family status. For example, one
could seek to protect those individuals (the majority of us?) who are more
likely to confide in a friend than a family member. In other words, there
could be an evidentiary privilege for confidential communications between
friends, as Sanford Levinson has suggested.91 Society has an interest in
fostering and preserving friendships.92 Indeed, society should have an
interest in ensuring that everyone has someone they can confide in. After
all, “the mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical heath, is a
public good of transcendent importance.”93 That citizens have confidantes,
whether that person is a spouse, family member, friend, clergy member,
psychotherapist, or, say, bartender, would appear to benefit us all. It is this
last argument that moves furthest away from the “marriage plot” and the
partiality toward marriage and that seems the most progressive to me.
This brings me back to Enron and the absence of evidentiary protections
for Kopper and Dodson. To simply pursue a “marriage plot” and argue that
Kopper and Dodson should receive the same evidentiary protections as
heterosexual married couples may seem like equality to some members of
the LGBT community, but that equality ignores the inequality that exists
when we favor those who are married over those who are not. Some years
ago, the theorist Michael Warner observed that “[m]arriage sanctifies some
couples at the expense of others. It is selective legitimacy . . . . Marriage,
in short, discriminates.”94 Nancy Polikoff makes a similar point: “When
law makes marriage the dividing line, it harms all unmarried people,
including those with children. The harm is the dividing line.”95 And they
are right.
All of this goes back to the 1989 debate between Paula Ettelbrick and
Tom Stoddard,96 which Ed Stein revisited in the Rutgers Law Review a few
years ago.97 Should the goal of the LGBT movement be to demand the
privileges (here, quite literally, an evidentiary privilege) of marriage, in
which case the goal is necessarily the invalidation of DOMA and the
91. Sanford Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of Friendship, 1984
DUKE L.J. 631; see also Dalton Conley, Spread the Wealth of Spousal Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 2007, at A13.
92. For an argument that the law should do more to recognize and foster friendships, see
Ethan J. Leib, Friendship and the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631 (2007).
93. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996).
94. MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL 82 (1999).
95. NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 123 (2008).
96. Paula Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK, Autumn
1989, at 8–12, reprinted in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY,
GENDER, AND THE LAW 1098–99 (2d ed. 2004); Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People Should
Seek the Right to Marry, OUT/LOOK, Autumn 1989, at 8–12, reprinted in ESKRIDGE &
HUNTER, supra note 96, at 1099–1101.
97. Edward Stein, Marriage or Liberation?: Reflections on Two Strategies in the
Struggle for Lesbian and Gay Rights and Relationship Recognition, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 567
(2009).
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securing of marriage equality? Or should the goal of the LGBT movement
be to challenge the institution of marriage itself? Are we fighting to be
admitted to the exclusive country (marriage) club? Or are we calling into
question the very notion of exclusive country (marriage) clubs to begin
with? If marriage is a necessary precursor to what Martha Fineman
designated the “appropriately constituted family”—defining “the normal
and designat[ing] the deviant”98—and we are saying we want to be normal,
doesn’t that necessarily mean we are accepting, to a certain extent, the
categorization of deviancy? In her seminal essay “Thinking Sex,” Gayle
Rubin argues that the state has never been nonpartisan when it comes to
intimacy and has always privileged some types of intimacy at the expense
of others. Her series of hierarchies bears repeating:
Good, Normal, Natural
Heterosexual
Married
Monogamous
Procreative
In pairs
In a relationship
Same generation
In private
No pornography
Bodies only
Vanilla

Bad, Abnormal, Unnatural
Homosexual
Unmarried
Promiscuous
Nonprocreative
Alone or in groups
Casual
Cross-generational
In public
Pornography
With manufactured objects
Sadomasochistic99

This is not a fixed list, of course; the benefits that attach to engaging in
approved intimacy and the stigma that attaches to engaging in suspect
intimacy vary over time and by geography.100 But the point remains the
same: to the extent that being married is seen as being better than
unmarried,101 marriage equality advocates want to be able to check the box
98. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 144 (1995); see also Melissa Murray, Strange
Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94
IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1267–68 (2009) (observing that family and criminal laws operate to
construct a boundary between legitimate sexual behavior (within marriage) from illegitimate
sexual behavior (outside of marriage)).
99. See Gayle S. Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of
Sexuality, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER 3, 28–30 (Henry Abelove et al. eds.,
1993).
100. See Bennett Capers, The Crime of Loving: Loving, Lawrence, and Beyond, in
LOVING V. VIRGINIA IN A POST-RACIAL WORLD: RETHINKING RACE, SEX, AND MARRIAGE 114
(Kevin Noble Maillard & Rose Cuison Villazor eds., 2012); Murray, supra note 98.
101. See Melissa Murray, What’s So New about the New Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 387, 436 (2012). It is telling that heterosexuals who opt out of
marriage are often pathologized “as immature, uncommitted, unfaithful, disloyal, undevoted,
and overly sexual.” Ruthann Robson, Compulsory Matrimony, in FEMINIST AND QUEER
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that says married. But this is buying into the system, not subverting it. In
doing so, far from upsetting the marriage cart, we are tightening its
wheels.102
There is also the issue of “our” inconsistent messaging.
To
traditionalists, we argue that allowing same-sex couples to marry will have
no effect on heterosexual, paradigmatic marriage.103 We even argue that, if
anything, allowing same-sex couples to marry will make LGBT individuals
better citizens—less promiscuous, more stable.104 But behind closed doors,
or rather among friends and allies, we argue that same-sex marriage has the
potential to disrupt traditional gender roles and female subordination in
marriage.105 My concern is not that this is the equivalent of speaking out of
both sides of one’s mouth, a practice I have no quarrel with when the ends
justify the means.
My concern is that what we’re telling the
traditionalists—that same-sex marriage will change nothing—will turn out
to be the truth.
A further concern is that the full-court press for marriage equality, so allencompassing that anyone who questions this priority may come to think of
herself as a traitor to the cause, seems to discourage “uncomfortable
conversations” about marriage itself. The way marriage is used as a
substitute for a public safety net for citizens is just one example.106 Instead
LEGAL THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 313, 324
(Martha Fineman et al. eds. 2009).
102. The words of David Blankenhorn, a former opponent of marriage equality who now
supports marriage equality, are in this sense both welcome and cause for concern.
I’d like to help build new coalitions bringing together gays who want to strengthen
marriage with straight people who want to do the same. For example, once we
accept gay marriage, might we also agree that marrying before having children is a
vital cultural value that all of us should do more to embrace? Can we agree that,
for all lovers who want their love to last, marriage is preferable to cohabitation?
David Blankenhorn, How My View on Gay Marriage Changed, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/how-my-view-on-gay-marriage-changed.html.
103. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE
FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 173 (2002). For a discussion of the harm debate, see Robert Justin
Lipkin, The Harm of Same-Sex Marriage: Real or Imagined?, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 277
(2005). For a discussion of the harm in terms of standing to intervene in DOMA litigation,
see Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 1539 (2012).
104. This is also the argument made by Ted Olson, one of the lawyers behind the court
challenge to California’s Proposition 8. See Theodore B. Olson, The Conservative Case for
Gay Marriage, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 18, 2010, at 48.
105. See, e.g., CARLOS A. BALL, THE MORALITY OF GAY RIGHTS: AN EXPLORATION IN
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2003); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 61 (1996); Kathryn Abrams,
Elusive Coalitions: Reconsidering the Politics of Gender and Sexuality, 57 UCLA L. REV.
1135, 1136 (2010); Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage
Litigation, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1199, 1201 (2010); Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and
Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 L. & SEXUALITY: REV. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 9, 17
(1991) (arguing that same-sex marriage has the potential to “destabilize the cultural meaning
of marriage”).
106. As Melissa Murray has observed:
[I]t is not just that marriage has become a substitute for government-provided
economic assistance to needy families. It is that marriage has become the de facto
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of questioning the myriad ways in which marriage is incentivized, so much
so that it has come to seem natural and normal to want to marry, and so
much so that it can be said that there is something akin to “compulsory
matrimony” in our society,107 marriage equality proponents often seem
unquestioningly to “carry a brief”108 for marriage. Instead of devoting
critical attention to how marriage manifests itself as another form of state
regulation, interrogating its disciplining function as Melissa Murray has
recently done,109 or addressing the prospect that marriage will make us
“good gays,”110 we simply accept its normativity and with it, its hegemony.
This embrace of a “marriage plot” seems all the more odd when one
views, as a marker of progress, the line from Bowers v. Hardwick,111 in
which the Supreme Court ruled that state laws criminalizing same-sex sex
did not violate the Constitution, to its decision in Lawrence v. Texas112
some seventeen years later, ruling that it did. Laurence Tribe famously
quipped that the issue in Bowers should have been “not what Michael
Hardwick was doing in the privacy of his own bedroom, but what the State
of Georgia was doing there.”113 Indeed, to a large extent, the victory in

social safety net for all families. . . . Expanding marriage to include same-sex
couples would improve health care coverage . . . . Expanding marriage would
legitimize the children of same-sex couples . . . . Likewise, expanding marriage
would provide certain immigration benefits to the same-sex spouses of American
citizens.
With this frame in mind, the LGBT rights movement’s prioritization of
marriage equality is sensible—marriage is a crucial conduit to a wide array of
public and private benefits. But importantly, all of these ends might be achieved—
for same-sex couples and everyone else—without marriage.
Melissa Murray, Black Marriage, White People, Red Herrings, 116 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 35–36) (on file with author).
107. See Robson, supra note 101, at 313. This phrasing borrows from Adrienne Rich. See
Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNS 631, 632
(1980).
108. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM
(2006); see also Franke, supra note 18, at 2698.
109. Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 40 (2012)
(arguing that marriage “continues to be a disciplining institution of critical importance to the
state’s project of constructing a disciplined citizenry”). One can even see the disciplining
function in Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006), in which the New York Court
of Appeals rejected an equal protection challenge to New York’s ban on same-sex marriage.
The court found that the ban satisfied the rational basis requirement in that it could be
justified by a determination that “an important function of marriage is to create more
stability and permanence in the relationships that cause children to be born.” Id. at 7. “It
thus could choose to offer an inducement—in the form of marriage and its attendant
benefits—to opposite-sex couples who make a solemn, long-term commitment to each
other.” Id. As Ruthann Robson has observed in her critique of the decision, from such
reasoning, “it would seem that the benefits of marriage are meant to induce—coerce?—
unwilling heterosexuals into marriage.” Robson, supra note 101, at 327.
110. WARNER, supra note 94, at 113.
111. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
112. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
113. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-21, at 1428 (2d ed.
1988).
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Lawrence was getting the state out of the bedroom.114 But if that was the
victory, it was a pyrrhic one. Having gotten the state out of the bedroom,
we now seem to want the state back in.115 Some years ago, Nan Hunter
observed, “Lawrence v. Texas marked a dramatic milestone in efforts to
limit state power to control homosexuality, but the product is likely to be a
different regulatory regime rather than a libertarian utopia.”116 Her words
may prove prescient. Indeed, the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s decision
in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health117 hints at as much. When
the Goodridge court ruled that the state could not deny marriage to samesex couples, many in the LGBT community viewed the decision as a cause
for celebration. But the court’s language should also occasion pause and
reflection. The court, after all, described marriage as a relationship between
“three partners,” not two: “two willing spouses and an approving State.”118
Of course, that marriage involves the state as a third partner has long been
true of heterosexual marriage. The issue is, do we too want the state as a
third partner? Is the contemporary battle for gay rights really a battle to
enjoy this particular ménage à trois?
To be clear, none of this is intended as an argument against the strategy
of pursuing the right to marry. But I do question the prioritization of this
strategy as a means for achieving anything approaching equality and what
has amounted to the pursuit of this strategy to the exclusion of all others. If
we were ever at a point where marriage could solve everything—providing
security, a home, financial stability, and the proverbial “happy ever after”—
we are certainly at that point no longer. The marriage plot, after all, was a
fictional device. And I question whether pursuing marriage equality comes
with unintended consequences: reifying distinctions based on marital
status, reifying a hierarchy between those who are married and those who
are not, and validating a system in which privileges follow accordingly.
My concern is that with domesticity comes domestication. My concern is
that marriage equality, beneath the surface, requires and entrenches marital
status inequality.
114. Of course, another way to read Lawrence is as granting a right that is decidedly
domesticated. See Murray, supra note 109, at 56 (Lawrence “paints Tyron Garner and John
Geddes Lawrence with the brush of marital domesticity, suggesting that the pair were a longterm couple.”); Laura Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex in and out of Intimacy, 59
EMORY L.J. 809, 814 (2010) (arguing that the language of Lawrence reveals the Court’s
concern for protecting sex that is connected to an emotional bond); Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy a
Woman?, 97 GEO. L.J. 485, 512 (2009) (observing that “within Lawrence’s famously heteronormative home discourse of domesticity and relationships, it was as if a front-region
performance of marriage-like intimacy were intruding on the back-region conduct of private
gay sex”); see also Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004).
115. I am reminded here of the framed needlepoint message, “Bless this Home,” still
found in many houses. Marriage equality advocates seem to want something similar, in
effect a government seal of approval.
116. Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of Heightened Scrutiny, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1528, 1554 (2004).
117. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
118. Id. at 954.
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All of which brings me, one last time, to the issue Enron almost raised
about DOMA and spousal privileges; or rather, to the story of Michael
Kopper and William Dodson. As a former federal prosecutor who
prosecuted securities crimes, I can imagine the thinking that likely went
into selecting Kopper as a target. Kopper can lead us to his boss Fastow.
And Kopper, as a gay man, will likely have an incentive to cooperate rather
than go to prison where gay men are targeted for abuse. And unlike the
situation with his married colleagues at Enron, we will be able to go after
his partner Dodson, subpoena Dodson to testify before the grand jury, and
compel Dodson to tell us every incriminating thing Kopper confided to him.
The response to this thinking could be to invoke the marriage plot. Let’s
allow same-sex couples to marry, thus allowing them the privileges
(including the evidentiary privileges) that come with marriage. Let’s treat
Kopper and Dodson as if they were a heterosexual married couple. Let’s
give them that privilege. That is one response. But hopefully this Essay
has prompted thoughts about other responses and other questions. After all,
allowing Kopper to marry or otherwise secure the benefit of spousal
privileges does little to alter the equation that made him, as a gay man, a
soft target for prosecutors in the first place. Beyond Kopper, how does
marriage equality, or securing spousal evidentiary privileges, benefit the
Enron employee who isn’t married? How does it benefit those individuals,
gay and straight and bisexual and transsexual, who are single, whether by
choice or happenstance? How does benefiting “just us” further justice?
CONCLUSION
My partner and I married in Massachusetts several years ago, and he and
I still disagree about the LGBT marriage agenda. His argument is that, with
marriage equality, other issues facing the LGBT community will resolve
themselves. I’m not so sure, especially when I think of the suicide rates
among LGBT youth,119 or the hate crimes committed against those
perceived to be gay or transgender (consider Massachusetts, which has seen
an increase in antigay bias crimes since it became a marriage equality
state),120 or the employment discrimination still faced by members of the
119. Lucia Graves, Gay Teen Suicides Pervasive, A ‘Hidden Problem’: Expert,
HUFFINGTON POST, (Oct. 22, 2010, 9:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/22/
gay-teen-suicides-a-hidden-problem_n_772707.html.
120. See COMMONWEALTH FUSION CTR., MASSACHUSETTS HATE CRIMES, 2008, available
at http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/eops/hatecrimes2008.pdf (noting sixty-two incidents of
reported antigay bias); COMMONWEALTH FUSION CTR., MASSACHUSETTS HATE CRIMES, 2007,
available at http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/eops/hatecrimes2007.pdf (noting seventy-six
incidents of reported antigay bias); COMMONWEALTH FUSION CTR., MASSACHUSETTS HATE
CRIMES, 2006, available at http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/eops/hatecrimes2006.pdf
(noting seventy-one incidents of reported antigay bias); COMMONWEALTH FUSION CTR.,
MASSACHUSETTS HATE CRIMES, 2005, available at http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/
eops/hatecrimes2005.pdf (noting sixty-three incidents of reported antigay bias);
COMMONWEALTH FUSION CTR., MASSACHUSETTS HATE CRIME, 2004, available at http://
www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/eops/hatecrimes2004.pdf (noting forty-three incidents of reported
antigay male bias).
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LGBT community. I find myself thinking of Robin Shahar, who, after
graduating from the top of her class at Emory Law School, lost her job offer
with the Georgia Attorney General’s Office when the Attorney General
learned that she was about to have a commitment ceremony with her samesex partner.121 Even if we secured marriage equality tomorrow, people like
Robin Shahar still wouldn’t have job security.
I think, too, about the reliance marriage equality advocates have placed
on Loving v. Virginia,122 the 1967 Supreme Court decision that declared
anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional and declared the existence of a
fundamental right to marry. As I have observed elsewhere, though a
watershed decision, Loving in fact changed very little.123 More than ten
years after Loving, only 36 percent of Americans believed interracial
couples should be able to marry.124 Even now, interracial couples face
horrible discrimination.125 So if Loving and Lawrence are the signposts that
get us to marriage equality, will marriage equality change that much? Will
it lessen the pressure to cover that Kenji Yoshino has so eloquently
explored,126 or weaken the hold of the gay closet?127 Will it make our
intimacy any less obscene in the eyes of society?128 Will marriage equality
mean that my partner and I will be able to hold hands in public without fear
of being targeted for verbal or physical harassment?
Anyway, my partner and I used to argue about the wisdom of the LGBT
movement’s prioritization of marriage equality. Now, we’ve simply agreed
to disagree. My hope is that readers who disagree with me will likewise
agree to disagree.
One final word. Note that I use the word partner, not husband. The word
husband still sounds awkward to me, only partially because, as a society,
we still think husband and wife, not husband and husband. Primarily, it
sounds awkward because of the connotations of what a husband is: man of
the house, bread-winner, all of those heteronormative, patriarchal
associations I’d rather avoid. It also reminds me of Audre Lorde’s
question: Is it really possible to disassemble the master’s house using the
master’s tools?129 Can we really change marriage—I’m talking real
change, not just changes at the margins—by seeking the invalidation of
121. Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 1995).
122. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
123. See Capers, supra note 100, at 118–19.
124. Margaret Talbot, Wedding Bells, THE NEW YORKER, May 21, 2012, at 19.
125. See, e.g., Susan Saulny, In Strangers’ Glances at Family, Tensions Linger, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 13, 2011, at A1; David Moyer, White Grandfather Detained While Walking
with Black Granddaughter: Scott Henson Cuffed by Texas Police, HUFFINGTON POST,
(Feb. 14, 2012, 9:13 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/14/white-grandfatherdetained_n_1275383.html.
126. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006).
127. See EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990).
128. See Elizabeth M. Glazer, When Obscenity Discriminates, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1379
(2008) (exploring how rules against obscenity disproportionately censor same-sex intimacy).
129. Audre Lorde, The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House, in
SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 110 (2007).
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DOMA and marrying our same-sex partners? I’m not so sure. What I am
sure of is that it is critical that we really have a long talk, however
uncomfortable it may be, before saying “I do.”

